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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal requires us to interpret the "discretionary 
function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act's general 
waiver of sovereign immunity. The District Court dismissed 
a wrongful death complaint against the United States, 
finding that the discretionary function exception to the 
Federal Tort Claim Act's waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 
U.S.C. S 2680(a), applied. We will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
The underlying facts are undisputed. In December 1993, 
Daniele Cestonaro, his wife Giovanna, and their daughter, 
all Italian citizens and residents, were vacationing in St. 
Croix, Virgin Islands. On the evening of December 28, the 
Cestonaros parked their rental car in a lot on Hospital 
Street in Christiansted. Upon returning to their car after 
dinner, the Cestonaros were confronted by two armed gun 
men. Daniele Cestonaro was shot and died almost 
immediately. 
 
The Hospital Street lot falls within the boundaries of the 
Christiansted National Historic Site owned and controlled 
by the United States Department of the Interior, National 
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Park Service. At the time of the murder, the Hospital Street 
lot was not an official parking lot. There were no signs 
designating or even indicating that it was a parking lot; it 
was neither paved nor striped. The lot's appearance, 
however, differed from the surrounding area in the 
Christiansted National Historic Site in terms of grade and 
surface, as it consisted of broken asphalt from a previous 
paving. Since the 1940s, the general public had used the 
Hospital Street lot as a parking area. Furthermore, the 
National Park Service was aware that crimes had occurred 
in the lot before December 28, 1993. In addition to crime 
incidents reports from the Virgin Island Police Department 
and its own park rangers, the National Park Service also 
received regular complaints about safety in the Hospital 
Street lot from local business owners.1  
 
It is undisputed that the National Park Service had done 
nothing to deter nighttime parking in the Hospital Street 
lot. It had not posted signs prohibiting parking, nor signs 
warning of dangers of nighttime parking, nor issued tickets 
for illegal parking. In fact, the lot was lighted at night. 
Some time after the lot came into the government's 
possession, five lights were installed illuminating the 
Hospital Street lot. It is undisputed the National Park 
Service maintained those lights.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The record also reflects the Virgin Islands Police Department and the 
National Park Service shared information on crimes occurring within the 
Site's boundaries. Ten days before Mr. Cestonaro's murder, the Virgin 
Islands Police Department responded to investigate afirst degree 
robbery, attempted assault, carjacking and kidnaping that had taken 
place in the Hospital Street lot. Despite the information sharing, the 
National Park Service officials deposed here professed having had no 
knowledge of this December 18 incident. 
 
But we need not reconcile these facts here. The National Park Service's 
knowledge, or lack thereof, of the dangers in the Hospital Street lot 
relates more directly to the underlying negligence claims than to whether 
the challenged actions here were protected by the discretionary function 
exception. See discussion infra. 
2. Because the Hospital Street lot falls within the boundaries of the 
National Historic Site, which was so designated in 1952, it is likely that 
any physical improvements to the parking lot during the subsequent 
four decades were the result of a government decision. The record, 
however, contains no information on this point -- it does not reflect 
exactly when the lights were installed; who made the decision to install 
them; nor why they were installed. As noted, the record does establish 
that the National Park Service maintains the lights. 
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Giovanna Cestonaro filed a wrongful death action against 
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. SS 1346(b), 2671, and the Virgin Islands Wrongful 
Death Statute, 5 V.I.C. S 76. In her complaint, Mrs. 
Cestonaro alleged that "[d]efendant was negligent in failing 
to provide adequate lighting and correct the known 
dangerous condition and to warn others about the 
existence of the dangerous condition" at the Hospital Street 
lot. The United States filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) asserting the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction because the challenged National 
Park Service actions fell under the discretionary function 
exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.3 
 
The District Court dismissed the complaint, finding the 
National Park Service's decisions concerning the Hospital 
Street lot were grounded in its mission to "safeguard the 
natural and historic integrity of national parks" and in its 
policy "to minimally intrude upon the setting of such 
parks." Cestonaro, Civ. No. 1995-102, slip op. at 11. 
 
Mrs. Cestonaro appealed. 
 
II. 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over the applicability of the discretionary 
function exception. See Gotha v. United States , 115 F.3d 
176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997); Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United 
States, 46 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). Because 
the government's challenge to the District Court's 
jurisdiction was a factual one under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 
we are not confined to the allegations in the complaint (nor 
was the District Court) and can look beyond the pleadings 
to decide factual matters relating to jurisdiction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Along with its motion to dismiss, the government also sought, in the 
alternative, judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. Because 
the District Court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it 
did 
not reach the government's alternative arguments. See Cestonaro v. 
United States, Civ. No. 1995-102, slip op. at 1 n.1, (D.V.I. Sept. 11, 
1998). We only address the discretionary function exception; we express 
no opinion with respect to the government's judgment on the pleadings 
and summary judgment motions. 
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See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 
884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
The Federal Tort Claims Act is a partial waiver of the 
sovereign immunity that would otherwise protect the United 
States from tort liability stemming from the actions of its 
employees. The express purpose of the FTCA is to make the 
United States liable "in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private individual under like circumstances 
. . . ." 28 U.S.C. S 2674. But the FTCA's waiver is tempered 
by several exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. S 2680. For our 
purposes, the relevant exception is the "discretionary 
function exception" that withdraws the waiver of sovereign 
immunity with regard to: 
 
       Any claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance 
       or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
       function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
       employee of the Government whether or not the 
       discretion involved be abused. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2680(a). 
 
The exception "marks the boundary between Congress' 
willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States 
and its desire to protect certain governmental activities 
from exposure to suit by private individuals." United States 
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig 
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984). The FTCA does not, 
however, define "discretionary function." As a result there 
has arisen a trove of case law identifying the contours of 
the government's tort liability. Our holding that the 
National Park Service's decisions concerning the Hospital 
Street lot fall outside the scope of the discretionary function 
exception is consistent with that jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 1997); Cope 
v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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B. 
 
The analytical framework of the discretionary function 
exception has been laid out by the Supreme Court in a 
trilogy of cases -- United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao 
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig), 467 U.S. 797 (1984); Berkovitz 
v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988); and United States v. 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991). See Gotha, 115 F.3d at 179- 
80. 
 
The first issue is whether "a federal statute, regulation, or 
policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an 
employee to follow." Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. If so, the 
exception cannot apply. If not, the question is whether the 
governmental action or inaction "is of the kind that the 
discretionary function exception was designed to shield." Id. 
If it is, the action constitutes the exercise of protected 
discretion, and the United States is immune from suit. 
 
The touchstone of the second step of the discretionary 
function test is susceptibility to policy analysis. See 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 ("The focus of the inquiry is not 
the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion 
conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the 
actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy 
analysis."). As we have previously stated, a plaintiff 's claim 
can only survive if "the challenged actions cannot `be 
grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.' " Gotha, 
115 F.3d at 179 (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325). The 
Court in Gaubert underscored the importance of the 
relationship between the discretionary decision and policy 
considerations, noting the exception applies only if the 
challenged actions can "be said to be based on the 
purposes that the regulatory regime seeks to accomplish." 
499 U.S. at 325 n.7. 
 
Before proceeding to apply the discretionary function 
analysis to the facts of this case, there is one remaining 
preliminary issue -- we must identify the challenged action. 
See Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 
1997) (noting that a crucial step in determining whether 
challenged action is protected "is to determine exactly what 
conduct is at issue"). As noted by the District Court, 
plaintiff 's complaint levels two allegations concerning the 
National Park Service's conduct: 
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       Defendant was negligent in failing to provide adequate 
       lighting and correct the known dangerous condition 
       and to warn others about the existence of the 
       dangerous condition. 
 
Compl. at P 7. In effect, plaintiff challenges the National 
Park Service's decisions concerning lighting and warning in 
the Hospital Street lot. From the record, it is unclear 
whether the National Park Service made a decision not to 
add lighting or warning signs to the Hospital Street lot or 
whether that resulted from inaction or a non-decision. As 
was the case in Gotha, however, "[i]t would appear that . . . 
the action or inaction goes more to the issue of negligence 
rather than whether the issue of policy discretion is 
implicated." 115 F.3d at 180. Because the question before 
us is only whether the nature of the actions taken, or not 
taken, are susceptible to policy analysis, we need not 
concern ourselves with whether the National Park Service 
acted affirmatively regarding either lighting or warning at 
the Hospital Street lot. See Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 284; 
Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 301, 308-09 (3d 
Cir. 1986) ("The test is not whether the government actually 
considered each possible alternative in the universe of 
options, but whether the conduct was of the type 
associated with the exercise of official discretion."). 
 
IV. 
 
A. 
 
As noted, the first step in our analysis is whether there 
was discretion over the challenged action, that is, whether 
a federal regulation or policy specifically prescribes a 
course of action. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. Plaintiff 
contends the National Park Service, by virtue of a 1985 
agreement with the Virgin Islands, had no discretion with 
respect to the Hospital Street lot. The 1985 agreement 
amended the 1952 Memorandum of Agreement that 
established the historic area. According to the plaintiff, the 
1985 Addendum mandated the removal of the Hospital 
Street lot by 1988, thereby eliminating any National Park 
Service discretion. 
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The 1985 Addendum states that: 
 
       Whereas it is the intent of both parties to implement 
       this addendum as early as possible within the next 3 
       years; NOW THEREFORE, it is understood that this 
       addendum is for the specific purpose of detailing the 
       specific remaining responsibilities of each party to 
       achieve the purposes and objectives of the said 
       Memorandum of Agreement, as amended. 
 
       The National Park Service shall, subject to the 
       availability of funds, assume and undertake the 
       following responsibilities: 
 
       A. Parking will . . . be removed from the area eas t of 
       Hospital Street and West of Fort Christiansvaern. . . . 
 
The District Court addressed the argument in two ways. 
First, it expressed skepticism that the 1985 Addendum 
constituted the kind of mandate that prevented the 
government's recourse to the discretionary function 
exception. Second, it held the plaintiff did not allege 
negligence on the part of the National Park Service for 
failing to close the parking lot, but rather for failing to 
provide adequate lighting or to warn of known dangers 
associated with nighttime parking in the lot. 
 
Given the qualification "subject to the availability of 
funds," the Addendum does not appear to be the kind of 
express mandate that precludes coverage by the 
discretionary function exception.  See, e.g. , Berkovitz, 486 
U.S. at 536 ("[T]he discretionary function exception will not 
apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy 
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to 
follow."). Here, the National Park Service's determination 
whether there were funds available seems to be the kind of 
judgment or choice inherent in the discretionary function 
exception. See id. ("[C]onduct cannot be discretionary 
unless it involves an element of judgment or choice."). The 
inclusion of "shall" in the Addendum language does not 
necessarily destroy the National Park Service's discretion. 
Cf. Brackin v. United States, 913 F.2d 858, 860 (11th Cir. 
1990) ("While the language of these guidelines often 
includes the word shall, it is clear that the decision to use 
one method as opposed to another is based upon numerous 
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factors including a consideration of a method that the 
parties can agree on."). 
 
But we need not determine whether the 1985 Addendum 
eliminates the National Park Service's discretion regarding 
the use of the Hospital Street lot. We agree with the District 
Court that the 1985 Addendum does not mandate a specific 
course of conduct and cannot be dispositive with respect to 
lighting and warning decisions in the Hospital Street lot. 
The lighting and warning decisions here, therefore, remain 
discretionary. 
 
But this does not end our inquiry.4 We must determine 
whether the discretionary lighting and warning decisions 
are susceptible to policy analysis and therefore enjoy the 
protection of the discretionary function exception. See, e.g., 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23 ("[E]ven assuming the 
challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, it 
remains to be decided whether that judgment is of the kind 
that the discretionary function exception was designed to 
shield." (internal quotations omitted)); Berkovitz, 486 U.S. 
at 546-47 ("[I]f the Bureau's policy leaves no room for an 
official to exercise policy judgment in performing a given 
act, or if the act simply does not involve the exercise of 
such judgment, the discretionary function exception does 
not bar a claim that the act was negligent or wrongful."). 
 
As recognized by the District Court, we made clear in 
Gotha that susceptibility analysis "is not a toothless 
standard that the government can satisfy merely by 
associating a decision with a regulatory concern." 
Cestonaro, Civ. No. 1995-102, slip op. at 15. In Gotha, 
plaintiff sought to sue the United States for its alleged 
negligent failure to install a staircase or bar passage down 
an embankment at the United States Navy's Underwater 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We are mindful that "[w]hen established government policy, as 
expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows 
a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the 
agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion." 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. That presumption, however, can be rebutted. 
See id. at 324-25 (noting that complaint can survive motion to dismiss 
if "the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said 
to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime"). 
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Tracking Range in St. Croix, Virgin Islands. Plaintiff slipped 
and fell while traveling along a footpath down the hillside. 
The United States contended its actions (or inactions) were 
motivated by "military, social and economic considerations." 
Gotha, 115 F.3d at 181 (internal quotations omitted). In 
rejecting the government's appeal to broad policy 
considerations that "conceivably could go to any decision by 
the Navy," we observed that "[t]his case is not about a 
national security concern, but rather a mundane, 
administrative, garden-variety, housekeeping problem that 
is about as far removed from the policies applicable to the 
Navy's mission as it is possible to get." Id.  We also 
concluded that "[i]t is difficult to conceive of a case more 
likely to have been within the contemplation of Congress 
when it abrogated sovereign immunity than the one before 
us." Id. at 182. That torts stemming from garden variety 
decisions fall outside the discretionary function exception is 
consistent with a primary motive behind the FTCA. See 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 & n.19 (1953) 
(noting that "[u]ppermost in the collective mind of Congress 
were the ordinary common-law torts" and that 
"congressional thought was centered on granting relief for 
the run-of-the-mine accidents"). In our view, the events 
surrounding Daniele Cestonaro's death are no more related 
to the National Park Service's policies than were the events 
surrounding Ms. Gotha's broken ankle related to the Navy's 
overarching policies. See discussion infra. What was true in 
Gotha is true here, except the consequences here were far 
more tragic. 
 
B. 
 
The National Park Service contends its decisions (or non- 
decisions) not to add lighting nor to post warning signs 
were grounded in its overarching objective of returning the 
area to its historic appearance.5 The government points to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "The United States has the burden of proving the applicability of the 
discretionary function exception." National Union Fire Ins. v. United 
States, 115 F.3d 1415, 1417 (9th Cir. 1997). See also 14 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Jurisdiction 3d. S 3658.1 at 639 
(1998) ("[M]ost courts have concluded that the burden of proving the 
applicability of the discretionary-function exception falls upon the 
United 
States."). 
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several documents to ground this policy concern. First, it 
relies on the original 1952 Memorandum of Agreement, 
which established the National Historic Site with the 
purpose of preserving the integrity of the historic structures 
and grounds. It also points to a 1972 Memorandum of 
Agreement which recited that its "basic objective in the 
management of Christiansted National Historic Site is to 
retain the architectural and historical integrity of the 
structures and their environment." The National Park 
Service also argues it is not expressly required to add 
lighting or post warning signs in the Hospital Street lot. 
 
The National Park Service's arguments are inapposite. It 
may be arguable that the initial decision to maintain 
parking at the Hospital Street lot was protected by the 
discretionary function exception. But assuming this were 
so, subsequent decisions concerning the Hospital Street lot 
were not necessarily protected. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co., 
Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); George v. United 
States, 735 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Ala. 1990). 
 
Indian Towing involved alleged negligence by the United 
States Coast Guard in its failure to properly maintain the 
light on a lighthouse it had established. Despite the Coast 
Guard's claim of sovereign immunity, the Court found the 
United States could be held liable under the FTCA for the 
negligent operation of the lighthouse even though the initial 
decision to establish a lighthouse was discretionary. The 
Court explained 
 
       The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse 
       service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate 
       a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance 
       on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated 
       to use due care to make certain that the light was kept 
       in good working order; and, if the light did become 
       extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further 
       obligated to use due care to discover this fact and to 
       repair the light or give warning that it was not 
       functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and 
       damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United 
       States is liable under the Tort Claims Act. 
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Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 69. In reasserting the 
vitality of Indian Towing, the Supreme Court has stated 
that 
 
       The [Indian Towing] Court stated that the initial 
       decision to undertake and maintain lighthouse services 
       was a discretionary judgment. The Court held, 
       however, that the failure to maintain the lighthouse in 
       good condition subjected the Government to suit under 
       the FTCA. The latter course of conduct did not involve 
       any permissible exercise of policy judgment. 
 
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538 n.3 (internal citations omitted). 
 
In George, a District Court rejected the National Forest 
Service's attempt to invoke the discretionary function 
exception when Mr. George was attacked by an alligator 
while swimming in a recreational swimming area 
designated by the Forest Service. The court held that 
although the decision to establish the swimming area was 
discretionary, the subsequent failure to warn the public of 
known dangers was not covered by the exception. See 
George, 735 F. Supp. at 1533 ("[O]nce the decision was 
made, the Forest Service was under a duty to act 
reasonably for protection of humans, particularly against 
hidden dangers known to the Service."). 
 
In a similar case, in which a swimmer was struck and 
killed by a boat in an unrestricted portion of a lake 
supervised by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that although a"zoning" 
decision that resulted in the area having no restrictions 
was discretionary, the subsequent failure to warn 
swimmers was not. Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 
898 (1989). In so holding, the court in Boyd rejected the 
government's argument that a finding that it had protected 
discretion with respect to initial "zoning" decisions 
necessitated a conclusion that the discretionary function 
exception protected all decisions affecting the zoned area. 
See id. ("[T]he government asserts that a discretionary 
decision not to zone an area necessarily makes 
discretionary a decision that nothing be done there, 
regardless of potential hazards. We do not agree."). 
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Even if there was protected discretion for the National 
Park Service's decision to maintain parking at the Hospital 
Street lot, that does not answer whether subsequent 
decisions were also protected. See Indian Towing , 350 U.S. 
at 69; Boyd, 881 F.2d at 898; George, 735 F. Supp. at 
1533. See also Patel v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 873, 
878 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (refusing to hold that "all actions 
taken in the course of serving a search warrant are 
protected by the discretionary function exception" despite 
recognizing that "decisions to investigate the alleged illegal 
activity, to obtain the search warrant, when and where to 
serve the warrant" among others were immune from suit 
because they were "based on public policy considerations"). 
 
The National Park Service fails to show how providing 
some lighting, but not more, is grounded in the policy 
objectives with respect to the management of the National 
Historic Site. Similarly, the National Park Service has not 
presented a viable argument as to how its alleged failure to 
warn is rooted in its policy objectives. The government has 
not argued that having some lighting at the Hospital Street 
lot, but not more lighting, is consistent with its policy 
objective of preserving the historical integrity of the 
structures and their environs at the National Historic Site. 
Nor has it argued that having an allegedly dimly lit parking 
lot with no warning signs is consistent with its stated 
objectives. We doubt it can reasonably make such 
arguments.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In past cases, the National Park Service has relied on 16 U.S.C. S 1 to 
argue the discretionary function exception protects its policy decisions 
made by balancing aesthetic against safety interests. See, e.g., Shansky 
v. United States, 164 F.3d 688 (1st Cir. 1999); Chantal v. United States, 
104 F.3d 207 (8th Cir. 1997); Bowman v. United States, 820 F.2d 1393 
(4th Cir. 1987). In the present case, the National Park Service might 
have argued that its decision not to install further lighting and/or post 
warning signs regarding the dangers relative to the Hospital Street lot 
involved a similar balancing given the historical nature of the 
Christiansted National Historic Site. The National Park Service, however, 
neither raised this argument before us nor cited the cases reflecting this 
balancing formula. This alone gives us ground to reject such a balancing 
formula. 
 
Accordingly, we see no tension between our decision and those 
reached in the cases cited. Under proper circumstances, the National 
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Looking beyond the government's general preservation of 
historicity argument, the District Court stated that 
"[f]urther and more importantly, the government argues 
that the NPS' decision reflected the NPS' hope that it could 
discourage parking -- a use of the Site inconsistent with 
the Site's historicity -- by eliminating all indicia of parking 
in the lot." Cestanaro, Civ. No. 1995-102, slip op. at 11. 
But, as noted, the record shows the National Park Service 
had not eliminated all indicia of parking in the Hospital 
Street lot. Neither had the National Park Service taken any 
action to restore the property to grade or surface of the 
original nor had it any plan to do so. 
 
In short, there is no evidence to support the government's 
contention, adopted by the District Court that "the NPS 
made no improvements to the Site, for fear that 
improvements would (1) detract from the historic scene; 
and (2) lead individuals to believe that the Hospital Street 
lot was a sanctioned parking area and so increase the 
number of individuals parking there, further undermining 
the Site's historic character." Id. at 16.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Park Service may balance aesthetic and safety interests and avoid 
liability through the discretionary function exception. To properly invoke 
an aesthetic interest, there must be a reasonable relationship between 
that interest and the challenged action. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
See also Shansky 164 F.3d at 695 (recognizing there must be a 
"plausible nexus between the challenged conduct and the asserted 
justification"). The Shansky court, relying both on the National Park 
Service's lack of knowledge of any prior incidents at the site and its 
demonstrated efforts to restore the site in an historically accurate 
manner, found the requisite connection between policy and justification 
satisfied. 164 F.3d at 695-96. As noted, neither factor pertains here. It 
is clear that the requisite nexus between the challenged action and 16 
U.S.C. S 1 is missing. 
 
7. As noted, the District Court understood the National Park Service to 
argue the discretionary function exception applied because it did not 
post signs so as to avoid unintentionally attracting additional parking, 
which in turn would be contrary to its policy of restoring the Site's 
historicity. The National Park Service has made similar claims in past 
cases involving the discretionary function exception. See Childers v. 
United States, 40 F.3d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1995). Although the National 
Park Service in Childers claimed its decision not to post warning signs 
on unmaintained winter trails in Yellowstone National Park was based, 
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In its attempt to fashion a policy rationale for the 
National Park Service's actions, the District Court also 
relied on the Christiansted General Management Plan, 
which set forth a management strategy for the site, and 
which called on the Park Service to: 
 
       preserve the historic site to as closely as possible 
       represent its appearance of the early to mid nineteenth 
       century . . . No physical alterations will be undertaken 
       to provide for . . . visitor safety, if it is determined that 
       such actions will impair significant architectural 
       features or structural systems. 
 
Id. at 11-12. 
 
The District Court accurately noted that the connection 
between the "above-described policy and the NPS' inaction 
in the instant matter is somewhat attenuated." Id. at 12. 
But it concluded that "the NPS' decision not to place 
improved lighting or signs at the Hospital Street lot can be 
characterized as part of an overall policy and so falls within 
the discretionary function exception." Id.  We disagree. 
 
As noted, the Supreme Court has made clear that the 
proper inquiry in analyzing the discretionary function 
exception is whether "the challenged acts of a Government 
employee . . . are of the nature and quality that Congress 
intended to shield from tort liability." Varig, 467 U.S. at 
813. In explaining Congress' intent, the Court emphasized 
that the core purpose of the exception was to "prevent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in part, on its cognizance "that posting warning signs would 
inadvertently attract visitors to unmaintained trails," the court decided 
the case on other grounds. Id. The National Park Service policy at issue 
in Childers provided: " `If roads and trails cannot be maintained as 
designed and built, they should either be closed or the public adequately 
warned.' " Id. (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found the National Park Services decision to provide warnings 
"though park brochures, visitor center displays, bulletin board 
information, and personal contacts" rather than by posting signs on 
trails was protected by the discretionary function exception. Id. Here, 
there is no evidence the National Park Service warned or attempted to 
warn of the potential danger of parking in the Hospital Street lot through 
any means. 
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judicial `second-guessing' of legislative and administrative 
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy 
through the medium of an action in tort." Id.  at 814. The 
exception is meant " `to protect the Government from 
liability that would seriously handicap efficient government 
operations.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 
150, 163 (1963)). 
 
In our view, plaintiff 's suit does not put the District 
Court in the position of second guessing a National Park 
Service administrative decision that is "grounded in social, 
economic, and political policy." We are unable tofind a 
rational nexus between the National Park Service's lighting 
or warning decisions (or non-decisions) and social, 
economic and political concerns. Nor will plaintiff 's claim 
seriously impede the National Park Service's proper 
functions or operations. The National Park Service remains 
free to make decisions grounded in policy considerations 
without risking tort liability; but it cannot make decisions 
unrelated to policy and then seek shelter under the 
discretionary function exception. See Sami v. United States, 
617 F.2d 755, 766-67 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[T]he exception 
exempts the United States from liability only where the 
question is not negligence but social wisdom, not due care 
but political practicability, not reasonableness but 
economic expediency." (internal quotations omitted)). 
 
In one of its early treatments of the FTCA, the Supreme 
Court articulated the Act's purpose in terms that 
underscore why the National Park Service cannot rely on 
the discretionary function exception here. The Court stated: 
 
       The broad and just purpose which the statute was 
       designed to effect was to compensate the victims of 
       negligence in the conduct of governmental affairs in 
       circumstances like unto those in which a private 
       person would be liable and not to leave just treatment 
       to the caprice and legislative burden of individual 
       private laws. 
 
Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 68-69. Would a private actor in 
the National Park Service's shoes be amenable to suit? We 
believe under the facts presented, the answer is yes. No 
challenged decision, or non-decision, taken here by the 
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National Park Service was reasonably rooted in policy 
considerations. As a result, the discretionary function 
exception does not apply. Plaintiff may or may not prevail 
on the merits, but the FTCA does not bar her suit. 8 
 
C. 
 
We do not hold that once an agency makes a decision 
inconsistent with its policies that all subsequent decisions 
must fall outside the discretionary function exception. 
Relying on Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 
plaintiff contends that by deciding to maintain a parking lot 
in the middle of the historic site contrary to its stated 
objective of returning the area to its early 19th Century 
appearance, the National Park Service abrogated its policies 
and cannot rely on them to justify its subsequent decisions 
concerning the Hospital Street lot. But Cope does not stand 
for such a broad proposition. 
 
In Cope, plaintiff was injured in an accident on Beach 
Drive which passes through Washington, D.C.'s Rock Creek 
Park. Plaintiff sustained injuries when a car crashed into 
his after losing traction on a curve in the rain. The National 
Park Service, which owns and operates Beach Drive, 
asserted a discretionary function exception defense saying 
that its decision not to place a "slippery when wet" warning 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In her appeal, Mrs. Cestonaro also raised whether the District Court 
abused its discretion in its treatment of her motion for reconsideration, 
which she claimed contained a request for leave to amend her complaint 
which was ignored by the District Court. In a footnote in her Motion to 
Reconsider, plaintiff stated: 
 
       In the event the Court feels that the allegation that the NPS was 
       negligent in failing to prohibit parking in the Hospital Street lot 
       should be pled more explicitly in the Complaint, Plaintiff requests 
       the opportunity to file a Motion to Amend the Complaint to include 
       such allegation. 
 
In light of our conclusion that the conduct challenged in plaintiff 's 
original complaint, as understood by the District Court, is not covered by 
the discretionary function exception, we need not address plaintiff 's 
motion for reconsideration. Upon the reinstatement of her suit, plaintiff 
may request leave to amend her complaint. See  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). We 
express no opinion whether such a motion should be granted. 
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sign before the curve was a discretionary policy decision. 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the 
District Court's dismissal based on the discretionary 
function exception, holding the decision of whether to post 
the sign was not rooted in policy considerations. See Cope, 
45 F.3d at 451-52. 
 
The Cope Court stated that it was unconvinced by the 
National Park Service's aesthetics argument given that 
"twenty-three traffic control, warning, and informational 
signs already exist on the half-mile stretch bracketing the 
curve on which the accident occurred--a stretch of road 
that carries 20,000 vehicles daily." Id. at 452 (internal 
quotations omitted). Recognizing that other aesthetics- 
based failure to warn cases had reached the opposite 
result, the D.C. Circuit stated that those decisions were 
"easily distinguishable [because] . . . the decisions were 
based on a reasonable desire to protect the experience of 
the park visitor." Id. We believe the essential holding in 
Cope to be that a decision (or non-decision) must be 
reasonably related to a policy consideration to fall under 
the discretionary function exception.9  
 
V. 
 
For the reasons stated, we hold the discretionary 
function exception does not apply to the National Park 
Service's decisions concerning the Hospital Street lot. We 
will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Note that this is different than asking whether a policy-based decision 
was correct or wise because such analysis would run afoul of the 
statutory command that the exception applies "whether or not the 
discretion be abused." 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a). 
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